[Rhodes22-list] Reply to Wally about Iraq Information (political)

[TN Rhodey]

Ed, I don't read the NY Times but you must read some filtered watered down
news. You really don't seem to be caught up on the facts.....our Military is
claiming that Iran is sending arms to Iraq.. How you missed this I will
never know. This has been discussed in pretty much every form of media. Do
your own research this is common knowledge. I don't know if this support is
from the government or private parties. I do agree that the Iranian people
are not as radical as their leaders but the fact is Iran is aiding Iraq
terrorists..It is also a fact that they used to hate each other. Heck Iraq
even used chemical warfare against Iran in the 80s..Hating us is indeed
become a common bond.

You make assumptions about what people read but you post more errors to this
list than anyone. Do you still think VP is in Legislative Branch? Even
Cheney realized the folly of that position and changed his mind.

I think most realize that the general media has some sort of bias. The facts
are pretty obvious.....we are still in Iraq, the threat of world wide terror
has increased, we have spent billions while not strengthening our hand.

Wally





On 7/11/07, Tootle <ekroposki at charter.net > wrote:
>
>
>
> Wally said, "Now Iran and Iraq seem to be unified in hating us."  Wally
> our
> new media is agenda driven and the way and which news they report has to
> agree with their anti Bush agenda.
>
> The people in control in Iran, both the political and religious try their
> best to make what you say appear true.  However, I ask you to produce
> independent data to prove that part of your assertion specifically
> relating
> to the general population.
>
> There are also groups in Iraq who are against us.  Specifically, it is
> those
> groups who lost power or who want unilateral control.  There is more than
> one group, but Al Qaeda is the best known.
>
> If you read the New York Times editorial that a reference was posted to on
> this forum, it said, "The political leaders Washington has backed are
> incapable of putting national interests ahead of sectarian score settling.
>
> The security forces Washington has trained behave more like partisan
> militias. Additional military forces poured into the Baghdad region have
> failed to change anything."  That is the New York Times agenda driven
> opinion.  The opinion is blatantly anti American.
>
> If you look at other information sources you can find other
> opinions.  Since
> you appear to accept there type opinion without challenge, there is
> nothing
> to be said.  Other sources of information do not agree with your opinion.
>
> As a youngster I was chastised in Religion class for asking hard question
> of
> those who asserted that they spoke the truth.  When I still ask the hard
> questions on demonstrating the facts on which the 'alleged truth' is
> based,
> I can say the New York Times editorial is not accurate.  Furthermore, it
> is
> agenda driven.  Learn not accept the national news media on the accuracy
> of
> what they report.
>
> Militant Islamists which includes Al Qaeda are a ruthless bunch, but do
> not
> necessary include a majority of people in Islamic countries.  They simply
> kill anyone who has another opinion.  The majority of people in those
> counties do not have the skills, equipment or strategies to deal with
> them.
> How does leaving that type in control make the world better for the U.S?
>
> Ask some of these questions:  If we leave Iraq who will gain
> control?  Will
> the U. S. be better off 10 years or so if those groups gain control?
>
> Ed K
> Greenville, SC, USA
> Addendum:  Lengthy commentary:
>
> This 'other side of the hill' report on the ISG was written from the
> al-Qaeda
> viewpoint .............interesting perspective
> _______________________________________________________________________________________________
>
> Every war has winners and losers.  The Iraq Study Group (ISG) report is
> written
> from the perspective of the latter.  It shows how the United States, by
> playing
> an overwhelmingly strong hand with breathtaking ineptitude, has foreclosed
>
> all
> options leading to victory, even if victory is down-defined to mean simply
> a
> stable Iraq.  With no path to success, defeat and a rapid U.S. pullout are
> inevitable.
> The following report is a paragraph-by-paragraph mirror-image of the ISG
> report
> written from the perspective of the winners, specifically al-Qaeda.  It is
> more
> realistic than the ISG report because it shows the many near- and
> intermediate-term options opening to the winners.  It shows that al-Qaeda,
>
> Baathists, Sunni insurgents, and "dead-enders," through a campaign of
> terror,
> have been able to sow chaos in Iraq, make the chaos self-amplifying, and
> render
> the "government" of "Iraq" powerless.  More importantly, it shows how
> turning
> Iraq into a failed state can open the way to meeting critical goals of
> al-Qaeda:
> defeating the United States, nullifying the credibility of the United
> States
> in
> the Middle East and much of the rest of the world, spurring turmoil
> throughout
> the Middle East, weakening and then toppling governments in Saudi Arabia,
> the
> smaller Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt, devastating Western economies, and
> perhaps leading to a nuclear strike against Israel or the United States.
> Why write from the perspective of al-Qaeda, which makes up a tiny fraction
> of
> the forces of chaos?  Because al-Qaeda, from the beginning, has had the
> broadest
> strategic view of any of the players and because it, in coordination (or
> at
> least in parallel) with other Sunni insurgents, is pursuing these goals
> successfully.  Its campaign of terror has proven to be the tactic that,
> ruthlessly pursued, has placed it on the path to reach many strategic
> objectives.  Would that the United States had been as able to have
> successful
> tactics, a successful strategy, and the intelligence (in the sense of
> brainpower) to link the one to the other!
>
> Al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group Report:  Executive Summary
> The situation in Iraq is proceeding far better, and far faster, than we
> had
> dared hope, and prospects for us to achieve our goals are improving at a
> quickening pace.  We have many paths to many victories.  Victory will
> build
> on
> victory, and we see new vistas of opportunity unfolding before our eyes
> every
> day.
> In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be
> taken
> in
> Iraq and the region. Actions to be taken against the United States will be
>
> the
> subject of a later report, but our victory in Iraq and the region will
> help
> us
> in these future actions.  Our most important recommendation calls for
> creating
> more chaos in Iraq in order to undermine the pathetic "government" of Iraq
>
> (which cannot govern even the Green Zone) and public opinion in the United
> States.  Undermining U.S. opinion and the Iraqi "government" are
> inseparable
> and
> mutually reinforcing.  As U.S. support for the war collapses, ordinary
> Iraqis
> and members of the Iraqi government alike will be forced to turn to their
> sects
> for protection.  This will deprive the government of any support and break
> Iraq
> apart, making the government collapse. And as the government collapses,
> U.S.
> citizens will see that there is no "Iraq" to defend, so their support for
> the
> war will collapse.  In fact, U.S. opinion has turned decisively against
> the
> war,
> and a few spectacular attacks, now in planning stages, will lead to an
> overwhelming U.S. consensus that will demand a hasty exit from Iraq, no
> matter
> how ignominious.  Our magnificent victory will strengthen our cause and
> create a
> sanctuary in Iraq, chaos will increase in this important part of the
> world,
> America's credibility and values will be dealt a humiliating blow from
> which
> the
> infidels will not recover for decades, and we will overthrow the corrupt
> House
> of Saud and begin to reestablish the Caliphate.
> Our successes so far have created complex and insuperable difficulties for
> the
> Americans and their Iraqi lackeys.  We have increased the scope and
> lethality of
> violence.  Our efforts to create chaos have gained an unstoppable
> momentum.
> From our initial de facto alliance with the Sunni Baathist insurgency, we
> have
> spurred Shiite militias and death squads and rampant criminality.  The
> Iraqi
> people voted in an election, but they feel betrayed because they created a
>
> government in name only that cannot deliver basic security or essential
> services.  Pessimism among the Americans and their Iraqi supporters is
> pervasive.  As a result, chaos and sectarian violence have grown and
> prospects
> for national reconciliation have vanished.
> As the situation continues to brighten, our prospects are outstanding. A
> slide
> toward chaos will trigger the collapse of Iraq's government and a
> catastrophe
> for infidels of every stripe.  Sunni-Shia clashes will spread.  Not only
> will
> neighboring countries intervene, but we will be able to undermine the
> corrupt
> rulers of Saudi Arabia and Jordan directly, and of Egypt indirectly. We
> will
> win
> an even larger propaganda victory and expand our base of operations. The
> global
> standing of the United States will be diminished even more than it has
> been
> to
> date. Americans will not become more polarized.  Instead, their defeat in
> Iraq,
> following upon their defeat in Vietnam, will unify them in a determination
> to
> avoid military interventions around the world, and especially in the
> Middle
> East.  As a result, no nation in the Middle East will risk depending on
> any
> U.S.
> security guarantees for decades to come.  In that large window of
> opportunity,
> the rulers of these nations will face public hostility, rebellions, and
> revolutions, all of which we will abet, and they will soon be forced to
> flee
> for
> their lives.
> During the past nine months we have considered a full range of approaches
> for
> moving forward. Each will improve the prospect for success of the others.
> We
> firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics to
> positively
> influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.
>
> External approach
> Iraq's neighbors greatly affect Iraq's stability.  Iran will benefit
> greatly
> from a chaotic Iraq and a U.S. defeat, as Iran would become the dominant
> power
> in the Middle East and would be able to proceed in its nuclear and
> regional
> ambitions; Saudia Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt will be
> mortally
> wounded by a chaotic Iraq, yet are too short-sighted, weak, and timid to
> act
> before it is too late.  Syria will benefit from a U.S. withdrawal from
> Iraq
> and
> the Middle East because that would reduce any U.S. military threat to
> Syria
> and
> would open a land route from Iran through Iraq to Syria and
> Hezbollah.  With
> Hezbollah strengthened, Syria could reassert its influence in Lebanon.  We
> feel
> that America has misjudged if it thinks that a disintegration of Iraq will
> lead
> to conflict between Iran and Syria.  They are allies, and have different
> spheres
> of influence in Iraq.  Moreover, Syria is not challenging Iran to be
> regional
> hegemon.
> The United States is considering a new diplomatic offensive to build an
> international consensus for stability in Iraq  and the region, but this is
>
> doomed to failure because it is apparent to all that America will withdraw
> in
> short order.  Americans may call it redeployment, strategic repositioning,
> or
> whatever they want, but everyone in the Middle East recognizes weakness
> and
> defeat for what they are, and will respond accordingly to protect their
> own
> interests as best they can without depending on the United States.  States
> outside the region, notably in Europe, will be harmed by a chaotic Iraq,
> but
> they have opposed the war from the beginning and are not about to send
> troops
> now.  They would rather see the U.S. effort collapse than take action to
> further
> their own self-interest.  Thus there is no way that Iraq's neighbors and
> key
> states in and out of the region will form a support group to reinforce
> security
> and national reconciliation within Iraq.  Since there will be no support
> group,
> and since Iraq cannot achieve security and national reconciliation on its
> own,
> Iraq — which was always a creation of the West — will come apart at the
> seams.
> America thinks that Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to
> Iraq,
> respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its
> influence
> over
> Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation.  This is not what
> Iran
> wants at all.  Iran is providing arms and training to Iraq in order to
> influence
> Iraqi Shia groups to ally with Iran.  Iran wants a fragmented Iraq, which
> will
> let it control a larger share of the world's oil supply and threaten Saudi
> Arabia, both of which will cause oil prices to rise, giving the Iranians
> vastly
> more wealth.  Saudi Arabia, unable to depend on U.S. armed forces for its
> defense, will cower in the face of Iran and will buy "peace in our time"
> by
> going along with Iranian demands for higher oil prices.  America hopes
> that
> the
> issue of Iran's nuclear programs will be dealt with by the five permanent
> members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, but we have
> seen
> how ineffectual the U.N. has been, given Russia's desire to have Iran as a
> customer and China's desire to have Iran as a supplier.  How very
> capitalistic!
> America thinks that Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the
> flow
> of funding, insurgents and terrorists in and out of Iraq, but America
> can't
> even
> keep millions of Mexicans out, so how can it expect Syria to do what it
> can't do
> — even if Syria wanted to.  America just does not "get it."
> Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and
> their
> interest in promoting chaos in Iraq, any American attempt to engage them
> constructively will fail. In large part, this is because the United States
> has
> no disincentives available.  As Thomas Friedman says, pain is the currency
> of
> the Middle East.  The imminent U.S. defeat removes U.S. ability to inflict
> pain.
> The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East.  Some in
> America
> think it can influence events in Iraq by dealing directly with the
> Arab-Israeli
> conflict and launching a renewed and sustained commitment by the United
> States
> to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts.  This is nonsense.
> Israel
> makes up less than one percent of the population and territory of the
> Middle
> East   But this is a nonsense that serves our interests.  The Israeli
> conflict
> with Lebanon and Palestine provide us with recruits and propaganda, and
> diverts
> America's attention and energy that might otherwise be used elsewhere in
> the
> Middle East.
> One place these resources might be used is Afghanistan, but the Taliban
> have
> turned the tide, NATO is tiring of the mission, and the withdrawal of U.S.
> forces from Afghanistan will make Afghans fearful of siding with NATO.  As
> in
> Iraq, once things go south for the West, they quickly become irreversible.
>
>
> Internal Approach
> Americans say that the most important questions about Iraq's future are
> now
> the
> responsibility of Iraqis, and that the United States must adjust its role
> in
> Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny.
> This
> is simply a way of saying that America no longer has the will or stomach
> to
> prevail.  Any nation that has lost the will to win is bound to lose.
> America's
> defeat is just around the corner.
> The Americans recommend that the Iraqi government should accelerate
> assuming
> responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of
> Iraqi
> Army brigades.  They are delusional.  While the Iraqi Army is the least
> ineffective of the Iraqi security forces, it is not effective.  Few if any
>
> units
> can fight on their own, and most won't fight with U.S. assistance.  Shiite
> units
> won't go to Sunni areas, and vice versa — and for good reason.  The United
> States doesn't think highly enough of Iraqi Army soldiers to provide them
> with
> proper equipment.  Soldiers return the favor by being away for a week or
> more
> each month, and more if a battle looms.  And the Iraqi police and
> Facilities
> Protection Service are so thoroughly infiltrated by members of various
> militias
> that they are, from the Iraqi government's viewpoint, totally ineffective
> or
> worse.  It will make no difference if the United States significantly
> increases
> the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, embedded
> in
> and
> supporting Iraqi Army units.  Training is not indoctrination.  If the
> soldiers
> and police oppose the Americans and sects other than their own, training
> simply
> provides them with more skills to oppose the Americans and support their
> own
> sects, hastening the day when U.S. soldiers are forced out of Iraq.  We
> appreciate whatever training and supplies the United States provides to
> those
> who support our work by increasing chaos.
> Even if the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq evolves to one of
> supporting
> the Iraqi Army, that army will be unable take over primary responsibility
> for
> combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, almost all U.S. combat
> brigades
> will be out of Iraq.  While the ISG conditions the withdrawal of some
> troops
> on
> unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, in
> reality
> it
> will be these "unexpected developments," or spectaculars as we prefer to
> call
> them, that will push U.S. opinion to the point where it demands a pullout
> sans
> fig leaf.  We have many "unexpected developments" in various stages of
> planning.
> As one fig leaf, ISG suggests that U.S . combat forces in Iraq could be
> deployed
> only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special
> operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection
> and
> search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A
> vital
> mission of those rapid-reaction and special operations forces would be to
> undertake strikes against al-Qaeda in Iraq.  This, again, is delusional.
> Everyone in Iraq, and indeed everyone around the world, will know that
> this
> halfway, half-hearted approach is just a way station for a total U.S.
> pullout
> and defeat.  Knowing this, Iraqi army soldiers will recognize that a
> unified
> Iraq is a lost cause, so each soldier will fight for his tribe or
> sect.  The
> fallacy of the "rapid" reaction approach was well demonstrated by the U.S.
> response to our Thanksgiving Day Massacre.  We killed 200 Shiites in a
> carefully-planned and well-coordinated series of attacks, and it took over
> 2
> hours for the "rapids" to react — even though they were based in Baghdad
> itself.
> Imagine how quickly they could react if based in Kuwait or Anbar!  By the
> time
> they launched strikes against us, we would be long gone, leaving them to
> kill
> noncombatants and make even more enemies for America.  The American public
> would
> see through this fig leaf, and would demand that the rapid reaction force
> not
> react.  The force would become a farce.
> The ISG recognizes that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the
> United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out security
> responsibilities. Yet the United States has made clear to Iraqis that it
> will
> soon be forced to withdraw in utter humiliation even if the Iraqi
> government
> implements the changes the United States wants it to undertake (which of
> course
> the Iraqi government will be unable to do).  As a result, fewer Iraqis
> will
> join
> the Iraqi Army, fewer of its soldiers will fight, and any remaining power
> that
> the Iraqi government has will disintegrate.
> As America retreats in defeat, its military leaders will no doubt
> emphasize
> training and education of forces that have returned to the United States
> in
> order to restore the force and its equipment to full combat
> capability.  But
> as
> with Vietnam, the American armed forces will learn the wrong lessons and
> buy
> the
> wrong equipment.  Vietnam, followed by Iraq, will expunge any support by
> the
> American public for many decades for wars by any name — wars of choice,
> wars
> of
> national liberation, counterinsurgency operations, or just plain war.
> The United States is deluding itself to think that Iraq's leaders can
> achieve
> specific objectives — or milestones — on national reconciliation, security
> and
> governance. Miracles cannot be expected and will not happen.  The people
> of
> Iraq
> had the right to expect action and progress.  But since this has not
> happened in
> 45 months, the Iraqi government has demonstrated to its own citizens — and
> the
> citizens of the United States and other countries — that it no longer
> deserves
> continued support, and in fact that it never did.
> Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United States, has
> put
> forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. This is a classic case of
> the
> puppet saying what the puppeteer wants it to say, even though both know
> that
> the
> puppet cannot do what the puppeteer wants it to do.  The puppet's list
> sounds
> noble, but neither words nor actions will enable it to succeed.  The ISG
> urges
> President Bush and his national security team to remain in close and
> frequent
> contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear message: there must be
> prompt action by the Iraqi government to take substantial progress toward
> the
> achievement of these milestones.  But if President Bush and his national
> security team were in even occasional contact with reality, they would
> realize
> that the Iraqi government cannot even slow the steady progression toward
> chaos.
> If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial
> progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,
> security and governance, the United States says that it would make clear
> its
> willingness to continue training, assistance and support for Iraq's
> security
> forces and to continue political, military and economic support.  But the
> United
> States is over a barrel of our making.  The Iraqi government will be able
> to
> accomplish none of the goals its masters have set out, leaving the United
> States
> in a position of supporting the Iraqi government despite its failure — in
> which
> case puppet becomes puppeteer — or following through on its threat and
> pulling
> out, blaming the puppet for the mistakes of the puppeteer.  That fig leaf
> will
> be transparent to all.
> The ISG's recommendations in several other areas, such as improvements to
> the
> Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, and the U.S.
> reconstruction
> efforts in Iraq, are all, as we say, rearranging the deck chairs on the
> observation deck of the World Trade Center.  Improvements to the U.S.
> budget
> process, the training of U.S. government personnel and U.S. intelligence
> capabilities will take years to implement, by which time the war will be
> long
> over.  Like everything else the United States has done in Iraq, will be
> too
> little, too late.
>
> Conclusion
> It is the unanimous view of the al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group that, because
> of
> our tactics and strategy, America has no viable options to stay in Iraq.
> Let us
> examine five options that President Bush is said to be considering, and
> see
> why
> they all fail:
>
>
> •                     "Go big," or pour in many troops, perhaps hundreds
> of
> thousands.  But U.S. public opinion strongly opposes this course, America
> does
> not have these troops in the short run, and by the time they could be
> created
> the war will be over.
> •                     "Go long," or stay in Iraq for many years with a
> small
> force.  If 140,000 troops cannot win in nearly four years, how can far
> fewer
> troops win in, say, eight years?   U.S. public opinion would oppose this
> course
> as sacrificing American troops for nothing.
> •                     "Surge," or deploy perhaps 20,000 additional troops
> to
> Baghdad to stabilize the situation, then withdraw them.  But we could
> simply
> lay
> low for awhile in Baghdad and launch attacks elsewhere in Iraq.
> Alternatively,
> we could attack the American troops in Baghdad, who would be like sitting
> ducks
> in a shooting gallery.
> •                     "Hunt al-Qaeda," or focus the U.S. military effort
> on
> attacking our fighters.  But any aggressive U.S. strategy will expose more
> U.S.
> soldiers to car bombs, house bombs, IEDs, small-arms fire, and ambushes.
> The
> U.S. public will not stand for these casualties.  In addition, an
> Americans
> focus on us will give other insurgent groups a freer hand in their
> activities.
> •                     "Support the Shia," or abandon Sunnis to their fate.
> This
> will bring on the wrath of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan.  None of these
>
> nations is at all likely to intervene in Iraq.  In particular, Saudi
> Arabia's
> failure to intervene would be a sign of weakness that would further
> undermine
> any shred of legitimacy of the House of Saud.
> With no viable options for staying in Iraq, with the Iraqi government
> collapsing, and with the American public tiring of the daily casualties,
> America
> will have no choice but to withdraw, leaving Iraq and the region in chaos.
>
> This will open the way for the next stages of our strategy.  To
> recapitulate:
> •                    We will continue our campaign of chaos.
> •                     We will force America to leave Iraq and the Middle
> East in
> a humiliating defeat.
> •                     The American defeat will make any threats of U.S.
> military
> intervention in the Middle East non-credible for decades to come.
> •                     With the American defeat, the so-called Iraqi
> government
> will fall like a rotten pomegranite, leaving chaos in its wake.
> •                     An Iraq in chaos will give us a sanctuary in the
> heart
> of
> the Middle East.
> •                     From this sanctuary, we will launch attacks on Saudi
>
> Arabia, Jordan, and others.
> •                     The expulsion of the United States from the region —
> a
> fitting coda to the Muslim expulsion from Spain in 1492 — will leave the
> corrupt
> Saudi rulers at the mercy of Iran, whose influence will grow through its
> close
> links with the Shia in southern Iraq.
> •                     Saudi Arabia will be forced to go along with Iran's
> calls
> for it to drastically reduce its oil exports.
> •                     This action, combined with the prospect of further
> chaos
> in the region, will double or triple the price of oil, forcing the West
> into
> a
> depression.
> •                     The increase in Iranian oil revenues will give Iran
> still
> more power to pursue its nuclear ambitions and to secure the support of
> its
> people.  The scarcity of oil will make China even less willing to go
> against
> Iran; the increase of Iranian petrodollars will make Russia even less
> willing to
> go against Iran.
> •                     The weakness of the Saudi government; pressure from
> Iran,
> Saudi Shiites, Saudi Wahabbis, al-Qaeda, and others; and Saudi realization
> that
> the United States will not come to its rescue, will force the Saudi
> monarchy
> to
> flee for their lives.
> •                     With Arabia no longer Saudi, it will be a simple
> matter to
> cut back or cut off Arabian oil exports, and incidentally those of the
> small
> Persian Gulf states, further deepening the West's depression.
> •                     An Iranian atomic bomb could lead Egypt to develop
> its
> own
> atomic bomb.
> •                     With Islam resurgent, it will be only a matter of
> time
> before an Islamic bomb, whether from Iran, Pakistan, or Egypt, or stolen
> from
> Russia or bought from a Russian criminal gang, winds up in Tel Aviv,
> Washington,
> New York, or London.
> •                     Victory will be ours!
> These steps form a strategy that needs to be implemented in a coordinated,
> sequential fashion, something that we have so far shown ourselves well
> able
> to
> do.  Our successes in Iraq have set the stage for broader, and much more
> important, successes in the region and the world.
> The prospects are dazzling.  There will be many glorious days ahead.  By
> continuing to pursue our present way forward, al-Qaeda will emerge
> stronger
> and
> the corrupt infidel governments of the United States and the region will
> be
> immeasurably weaker.
>
>
>
> --
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> http://www.nabble.com/Iraq-Update-tf4048809.html#a11545715
> Sent from the Rhodes 22 mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
>
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