[Rhodes22-list] Reply to Wally about Iraq Information (political)

TN Rhodey tnrhodey at gmail.com
Thu Jul 12 12:17:59 EDT 2007


Herb, I will not give a political response. But the issue was that Cheney
claimed to be in first in the Executive, then the legislative, and then
none.

peace!

Wally

On 7/12/07, Herb Parsons <HParsons at parsonsys.com> wrote:
>
> Wally,
>
> I caught the tail end of part of the "vice president in the legislative
> branch" when I started trying to catch up. I almost posed it then, but
> didn't. Since I see that you seem to be all caught up in the "I'm
> smarter than you" personal attacks, I think this would be a good time to
> throw a little powder on the fire.
>
> Doesn't the constitution dictate that the Vice President of the United
> States also serves as president of the Senate?
> Isn't the Senate the legislative branch?
>
> If I'm not mistaken, presiding over the senate is his only
> constitutionally dictated job. The rest of the position is a waiting
> game (to see if something happens to the President), with whatever
> additional duties the President chooses to give him.
>
> Herb Parsons
>
> S/V O'Jure
>   1976 O'Day 25
>   Lake Grapevine, N TX
>
> S/V Reve de Papa
>   1971 Coronado 35
>   Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana Coast
>
> >>> "TN Rhodey" <tnrhodey at gmail.com> 7/12/2007 7:53 AM >>>
> Ed, I don't read the NY Times but you must read some filtered watered
> down
> news. You really don't seem to be caught up on the facts.....our
> Military is
> claiming that Iran is sending arms to Iraq.. How you missed this I
> will
> never know. This has been discussed in pretty much every form of media.
> Do
> your own research this is common knowledge. I don't know if this
> support is
> from the government or private parties. I do agree that the Iranian
> people
> are not as radical as their leaders but the fact is Iran is aiding
> Iraq
> terrorists..It is also a fact that they used to hate each other. Heck
> Iraq
> even used chemical warfare against Iran in the 80s..Hating us is
> indeed
> become a common bond.
>
> You make assumptions about what people read but you post more errors to
> this
> list than anyone. Do you still think VP is in Legislative Branch? Even
> Cheney realized the folly of that position and changed his mind.
>
> I think most realize that the general media has some sort of bias. The
> facts
> are pretty obvious.....we are still in Iraq, the threat of world wide
> terror
> has increased, we have spent billions while not strengthening our
> hand.
>
> Wally
>
>
>
>
>
> On 7/11/07, Tootle <ekroposki at charter.net > wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Wally said, "Now Iran and Iraq seem to be unified in hating us."
> Wally
> > our
> > new media is agenda driven and the way and which news they report has
> to
> > agree with their anti Bush agenda.
> >
> > The people in control in Iran, both the political and religious try
> their
> > best to make what you say appear true.  However, I ask you to
> produce
> > independent data to prove that part of your assertion specifically
> > relating
> > to the general population.
> >
> > There are also groups in Iraq who are against us.  Specifically, it
> is
> > those
> > groups who lost power or who want unilateral control.  There is more
> than
> > one group, but Al Qaeda is the best known.
> >
> > If you read the New York Times editorial that a reference was posted
> to on
> > this forum, it said, "The political leaders Washington has backed
> are
> > incapable of putting national interests ahead of sectarian score
> settling.
> >
> > The security forces Washington has trained behave more like partisan
> > militias. Additional military forces poured into the Baghdad region
> have
> > failed to change anything."  That is the New York Times agenda
> driven
> > opinion.  The opinion is blatantly anti American.
> >
> > If you look at other information sources you can find other
> > opinions.  Since
> > you appear to accept there type opinion without challenge, there is
> > nothing
> > to be said.  Other sources of information do not agree with your
> opinion.
> >
> > As a youngster I was chastised in Religion class for asking hard
> question
> > of
> > those who asserted that they spoke the truth.  When I still ask the
> hard
> > questions on demonstrating the facts on which the 'alleged truth' is
> > based,
> > I can say the New York Times editorial is not accurate.  Furthermore,
> it
> > is
> > agenda driven.  Learn not accept the national news media on the
> accuracy
> > of
> > what they report.
> >
> > Militant Islamists which includes Al Qaeda are a ruthless bunch, but
> do
> > not
> > necessary include a majority of people in Islamic countries.  They
> simply
> > kill anyone who has another opinion.  The majority of people in
> those
> > counties do not have the skills, equipment or strategies to deal
> with
> > them.
> > How does leaving that type in control make the world better for the
> U.S?
> >
> > Ask some of these questions:  If we leave Iraq who will gain
> > control?  Will
> > the U. S. be better off 10 years or so if those groups gain control?
> >
> > Ed K
> > Greenville, SC, USA
> > Addendum:  Lengthy commentary:
> >
> > This 'other side of the hill' report on the ISG was written from the
> > al-Qaeda
> > viewpoint .............interesting perspective
> >
>
> _______________________________________________________________________________________________
> >
> > Every war has winners and losers.  The Iraq Study Group (ISG) report
> is
> > written
> > from the perspective of the latter.  It shows how the United States,
> by
> > playing
> > an overwhelmingly strong hand with breathtaking ineptitude, has
> foreclosed
> >
> > all
> > options leading to victory, even if victory is down-defined to mean
> simply
> > a
> > stable Iraq.  With no path to success, defeat and a rapid U.S.
> pullout are
> > inevitable.
> > The following report is a paragraph-by-paragraph mirror-image of the
> ISG
> > report
> > written from the perspective of the winners, specifically al-Qaeda.
> It is
> > more
> > realistic than the ISG report because it shows the many near- and
> > intermediate-term options opening to the winners.  It shows that
> al-Qaeda,
> >
> > Baathists, Sunni insurgents, and "dead-enders," through a campaign
> of
> > terror,
> > have been able to sow chaos in Iraq, make the chaos self-amplifying,
> and
> > render
> > the "government" of "Iraq" powerless.  More importantly, it shows
> how
> > turning
> > Iraq into a failed state can open the way to meeting critical goals
> of
> > al-Qaeda:
> > defeating the United States, nullifying the credibility of the
> United
> > States
> > in
> > the Middle East and much of the rest of the world, spurring turmoil
> > throughout
> > the Middle East, weakening and then toppling governments in Saudi
> Arabia,
> > the
> > smaller Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt, devastating Western
> economies, and
> > perhaps leading to a nuclear strike against Israel or the United
> States.
> > Why write from the perspective of al-Qaeda, which makes up a tiny
> fraction
> > of
> > the forces of chaos?  Because al-Qaeda, from the beginning, has had
> the
> > broadest
> > strategic view of any of the players and because it, in coordination
> (or
> > at
> > least in parallel) with other Sunni insurgents, is pursuing these
> goals
> > successfully.  Its campaign of terror has proven to be the tactic
> that,
> > ruthlessly pursued, has placed it on the path to reach many
> strategic
> > objectives.  Would that the United States had been as able to have
> > successful
> > tactics, a successful strategy, and the intelligence (in the sense
> of
> > brainpower) to link the one to the other!
> >
> > Al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group Report:  Executive Summary
> > The situation in Iraq is proceeding far better, and far faster, than
> we
> > had
> > dared hope, and prospects for us to achieve our goals are improving
> at a
> > quickening pace.  We have many paths to many victories.  Victory
> will
> > build
> > on
> > victory, and we see new vistas of opportunity unfolding before our
> eyes
> > every
> > day.
> > In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to
> be
> > taken
> > in
> > Iraq and the region. Actions to be taken against the United States
> will be
> >
> > the
> > subject of a later report, but our victory in Iraq and the region
> will
> > help
> > us
> > in these future actions.  Our most important recommendation calls
> for
> > creating
> > more chaos in Iraq in order to undermine the pathetic "government" of
> Iraq
> >
> > (which cannot govern even the Green Zone) and public opinion in the
> United
> > States.  Undermining U.S. opinion and the Iraqi "government" are
> > inseparable
> > and
> > mutually reinforcing.  As U.S. support for the war collapses,
> ordinary
> > Iraqis
> > and members of the Iraqi government alike will be forced to turn to
> their
> > sects
> > for protection.  This will deprive the government of any support and
> break
> > Iraq
> > apart, making the government collapse. And as the government
> collapses,
> > U.S.
> > citizens will see that there is no "Iraq" to defend, so their support
> for
> > the
> > war will collapse.  In fact, U.S. opinion has turned decisively
> against
> > the
> > war,
> > and a few spectacular attacks, now in planning stages, will lead to
> an
> > overwhelming U.S. consensus that will demand a hasty exit from Iraq,
> no
> > matter
> > how ignominious.  Our magnificent victory will strengthen our cause
> and
> > create a
> > sanctuary in Iraq, chaos will increase in this important part of the
> > world,
> > America's credibility and values will be dealt a humiliating blow
> from
> > which
> > the
> > infidels will not recover for decades, and we will overthrow the
> corrupt
> > House
> > of Saud and begin to reestablish the Caliphate.
> > Our successes so far have created complex and insuperable
> difficulties for
> > the
> > Americans and their Iraqi lackeys.  We have increased the scope and
> > lethality of
> > violence.  Our efforts to create chaos have gained an unstoppable
> > momentum.
> > From our initial de facto alliance with the Sunni Baathist
> insurgency, we
> > have
> > spurred Shiite militias and death squads and rampant criminality.
> The
> > Iraqi
> > people voted in an election, but they feel betrayed because they
> created a
> >
> > government in name only that cannot deliver basic security or
> essential
> > services.  Pessimism among the Americans and their Iraqi supporters
> is
> > pervasive.  As a result, chaos and sectarian violence have grown and
> > prospects
> > for national reconciliation have vanished.
> > As the situation continues to brighten, our prospects are
> outstanding. A
> > slide
> > toward chaos will trigger the collapse of Iraq's government and a
> > catastrophe
> > for infidels of every stripe.  Sunni-Shia clashes will spread.  Not
> only
> > will
> > neighboring countries intervene, but we will be able to undermine
> the
> > corrupt
> > rulers of Saudi Arabia and Jordan directly, and of Egypt indirectly.
> We
> > will
> > win
> > an even larger propaganda victory and expand our base of operations.
> The
> > global
> > standing of the United States will be diminished even more than it
> has
> > been
> > to
> > date. Americans will not become more polarized.  Instead, their
> defeat in
> > Iraq,
> > following upon their defeat in Vietnam, will unify them in a
> determination
> > to
> > avoid military interventions around the world, and especially in the
> > Middle
> > East.  As a result, no nation in the Middle East will risk depending
> on
> > any
> > U.S.
> > security guarantees for decades to come.  In that large window of
> > opportunity,
> > the rulers of these nations will face public hostility, rebellions,
> and
> > revolutions, all of which we will abet, and they will soon be forced
> to
> > flee
> > for
> > their lives.
> > During the past nine months we have considered a full range of
> approaches
> > for
> > moving forward. Each will improve the prospect for success of the
> others.
> > We
> > firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics to
> > positively
> > influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.
> >
> > External approach
> > Iraq's neighbors greatly affect Iraq's stability.  Iran will benefit
> > greatly
> > from a chaotic Iraq and a U.S. defeat, as Iran would become the
> dominant
> > power
> > in the Middle East and would be able to proceed in its nuclear and
> > regional
> > ambitions; Saudia Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and Egypt will be
> > mortally
> > wounded by a chaotic Iraq, yet are too short-sighted, weak, and timid
> to
> > act
> > before it is too late.  Syria will benefit from a U.S. withdrawal
> from
> > Iraq
> > and
> > the Middle East because that would reduce any U.S. military threat
> to
> > Syria
> > and
> > would open a land route from Iran through Iraq to Syria and
> > Hezbollah.  With
> > Hezbollah strengthened, Syria could reassert its influence in
> Lebanon.  We
> > feel
> > that America has misjudged if it thinks that a disintegration of Iraq
> will
> > lead
> > to conflict between Iran and Syria.  They are allies, and have
> different
> > spheres
> > of influence in Iraq.  Moreover, Syria is not challenging Iran to be
> > regional
> > hegemon.
> > The United States is considering a new diplomatic offensive to build
> an
> > international consensus for stability in Iraq  and the region, but
> this is
> >
> > doomed to failure because it is apparent to all that America will
> withdraw
> > in
> > short order.  Americans may call it redeployment, strategic
> repositioning,
> > or
> > whatever they want, but everyone in the Middle East recognizes
> weakness
> > and
> > defeat for what they are, and will respond accordingly to protect
> their
> > own
> > interests as best they can without depending on the United States.
> States
> > outside the region, notably in Europe, will be harmed by a chaotic
> Iraq,
> > but
> > they have opposed the war from the beginning and are not about to
> send
> > troops
> > now.  They would rather see the U.S. effort collapse than take action
> to
> > further
> > their own self-interest.  Thus there is no way that Iraq's neighbors
> and
> > key
> > states in and out of the region will form a support group to
> reinforce
> > security
> > and national reconciliation within Iraq.  Since there will be no
> support
> > group,
> > and since Iraq cannot achieve security and national reconciliation on
> its
> > own,
> > Iraq â€" which was always a creation of the West â€" will come apart
> at the
> > seams.
> > America thinks that Iran should stem the flow of arms and training
> to
> > Iraq,
> > respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its
> > influence
> > over
> > Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation.  This is not
> what
> > Iran
> > wants at all.  Iran is providing arms and training to Iraq in order
> to
> > influence
> > Iraqi Shia groups to ally with Iran.  Iran wants a fragmented Iraq,
> which
> > will
> > let it control a larger share of the world's oil supply and threaten
> Saudi
> > Arabia, both of which will cause oil prices to rise, giving the
> Iranians
> > vastly
> > more wealth.  Saudi Arabia, unable to depend on U.S. armed forces for
> its
> > defense, will cower in the face of Iran and will buy "peace in our
> time"
> > by
> > going along with Iranian demands for higher oil prices.  America
> hopes
> > that
> > the
> > issue of Iran's nuclear programs will be dealt with by the five
> permanent
> > members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, but we
> have
> > seen
> > how ineffectual the U.N. has been, given Russia's desire to have Iran
> as a
> > customer and China's desire to have Iran as a supplier.  How very
> > capitalistic!
> > America thinks that Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem
> the
> > flow
> > of funding, insurgents and terrorists in and out of Iraq, but
> America
> > can't
> > even
> > keep millions of Mexicans out, so how can it expect Syria to do what
> it
> > can't do
> > â€" even if Syria wanted to.  America just does not "get it."
> > Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq
> and
> > their
> > interest in promoting chaos in Iraq, any American attempt to engage
> them
> > constructively will fail. In large part, this is because the United
> States
> > has
> > no disincentives available.  As Thomas Friedman says, pain is the
> currency
> > of
> > the Middle East.  The imminent U.S. defeat removes U.S. ability to
> inflict
> > pain.
> > The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East.  Some
> in
> > America
> > think it can influence events in Iraq by dealing directly with the
> > Arab-Israeli
> > conflict and launching a renewed and sustained commitment by the
> United
> > States
> > to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts.  This is
> nonsense.
> > Israel
> > makes up less than one percent of the population and territory of
> the
> > Middle
> > East   But this is a nonsense that serves our interests.  The
> Israeli
> > conflict
> > with Lebanon and Palestine provide us with recruits and propaganda,
> and
> > diverts
> > America's attention and energy that might otherwise be used elsewhere
> in
> > the
> > Middle East.
> > One place these resources might be used is Afghanistan, but the
> Taliban
> > have
> > turned the tide, NATO is tiring of the mission, and the withdrawal of
> U.S.
> > forces from Afghanistan will make Afghans fearful of siding with
> NATO.  As
> > in
> > Iraq, once things go south for the West, they quickly become
> irreversible.
> >
> >
> > Internal Approach
> > Americans say that the most important questions about Iraq's future
> are
> > now
> > the
> > responsibility of Iraqis, and that the United States must adjust its
> role
> > in
> > Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own
> destiny.
> > This
> > is simply a way of saying that America no longer has the will or
> stomach
> > to
> > prevail.  Any nation that has lost the will to win is bound to lose.
> > America's
> > defeat is just around the corner.
> > The Americans recommend that the Iraqi government should accelerate
> > assuming
> > responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and
> quality of
> > Iraqi
> > Army brigades.  They are delusional.  While the Iraqi Army is the
> least
> > ineffective of the Iraqi security forces, it is not effective.  Few
> if any
> >
> > units
> > can fight on their own, and most won't fight with U.S. assistance.
> Shiite
> > units
> > won't go to Sunni areas, and vice versa â€" and for good reason.  The
> United
> > States doesn't think highly enough of Iraqi Army soldiers to provide
> them
> > with
> > proper equipment.  Soldiers return the favor by being away for a week
> or
> > more
> > each month, and more if a battle looms.  And the Iraqi police and
> > Facilities
> > Protection Service are so thoroughly infiltrated by members of
> various
> > militias
> > that they are, from the Iraqi government's viewpoint, totally
> ineffective
> > or
> > worse.  It will make no difference if the United States
> significantly
> > increases
> > the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops,
> embedded
> > in
> > and
> > supporting Iraqi Army units.  Training is not indoctrination.  If
> the
> > soldiers
> > and police oppose the Americans and sects other than their own,
> training
> > simply
> > provides them with more skills to oppose the Americans and support
> their
> > own
> > sects, hastening the day when U.S. soldiers are forced out of Iraq.
> We
> > appreciate whatever training and supplies the United States provides
> to
> > those
> > who support our work by increasing chaos.
> > Even if the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq evolves to one of
> > supporting
> > the Iraqi Army, that army will be unable take over primary
> responsibility
> > for
> > combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, almost all U.S.
> combat
> > brigades
> > will be out of Iraq.  While the ISG conditions the withdrawal of
> some
> > troops
> > on
> > unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, in
> > reality
> > it
> > will be these "unexpected developments," or spectaculars as we prefer
> to
> > call
> > them, that will push U.S. opinion to the point where it demands a
> pullout
> > sans
> > fig leaf.  We have many "unexpected developments" in various stages
> of
> > planning.
> > As one fig leaf, ISG suggests that U.S . combat forces in Iraq could
> be
> > deployed
> > only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and
> special
> > operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force
> protection
> > and
> > search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue.
> A
> > vital
> > mission of those rapid-reaction and special operations forces would
> be to
> > undertake strikes against al-Qaeda in Iraq.  This, again, is
> delusional.
> > Everyone in Iraq, and indeed everyone around the world, will know
> that
> > this
> > halfway, half-hearted approach is just a way station for a total
> U.S.
> > pullout
> > and defeat.  Knowing this, Iraqi army soldiers will recognize that a
> > unified
> > Iraq is a lost cause, so each soldier will fight for his tribe or
> > sect.  The
> > fallacy of the "rapid" reaction approach was well demonstrated by the
> U.S.
> > response to our Thanksgiving Day Massacre.  We killed 200 Shiites in
> a
> > carefully-planned and well-coordinated series of attacks, and it took
> over
> > 2
> > hours for the "rapids" to react â€" even though they were based in
> Baghdad
> > itself.
> > Imagine how quickly they could react if based in Kuwait or Anbar!  By
> the
> > time
> > they launched strikes against us, we would be long gone, leaving them
> to
> > kill
> > noncombatants and make even more enemies for America.  The American
> public
> > would
> > see through this fig leaf, and would demand that the rapid reaction
> force
> > not
> > react.  The force would become a farce.
> > The ISG recognizes that the Iraqi government will need assistance
> from the
> > United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out
> security
> > responsibilities. Yet the United States has made clear to Iraqis that
> it
> > will
> > soon be forced to withdraw in utter humiliation even if the Iraqi
> > government
> > implements the changes the United States wants it to undertake (which
> of
> > course
> > the Iraqi government will be unable to do).  As a result, fewer
> Iraqis
> > will
> > join
> > the Iraqi Army, fewer of its soldiers will fight, and any remaining
> power
> > that
> > the Iraqi government has will disintegrate.
> > As America retreats in defeat, its military leaders will no doubt
> > emphasize
> > training and education of forces that have returned to the United
> States
> > in
> > order to restore the force and its equipment to full combat
> > capability.  But
> > as
> > with Vietnam, the American armed forces will learn the wrong lessons
> and
> > buy
> > the
> > wrong equipment.  Vietnam, followed by Iraq, will expunge any support
> by
> > the
> > American public for many decades for wars by any name â€" wars of
> choice,
> > wars
> > of
> > national liberation, counterinsurgency operations, or just plain
> war.
> > The United States is deluding itself to think that Iraq's leaders
> can
> > achieve
> > specific objectives â€" or milestones â€" on national reconciliation,
> security
> > and
> > governance. Miracles cannot be expected and will not happen.  The
> people
> > of
> > Iraq
> > had the right to expect action and progress.  But since this has not
> > happened in
> > 45 months, the Iraqi government has demonstrated to its own citizens
> â€" and
> > the
> > citizens of the United States and other countries â€" that it no
> longer
> > deserves
> > continued support, and in fact that it never did.
> > Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United
> States, has
> > put
> > forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. This is a classic case
> of
> > the
> > puppet saying what the puppeteer wants it to say, even though both
> know
> > that
> > the
> > puppet cannot do what the puppeteer wants it to do.  The puppet's
> list
> > sounds
> > noble, but neither words nor actions will enable it to succeed.  The
> ISG
> > urges
> > President Bush and his national security team to remain in close and
> > frequent
> > contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear message: there
> must be
> > prompt action by the Iraqi government to take substantial progress
> toward
> > the
> > achievement of these milestones.  But if President Bush and his
> national
> > security team were in even occasional contact with reality, they
> would
> > realize
> > that the Iraqi government cannot even slow the steady progression
> toward
> > chaos.
> > If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes
> substantial
> > progress toward the achievement of milestones on national
> reconciliation,
> > security and governance, the United States says that it would make
> clear
> > its
> > willingness to continue training, assistance and support for Iraq's
> > security
> > forces and to continue political, military and economic support.  But
> the
> > United
> > States is over a barrel of our making.  The Iraqi government will be
> able
> > to
> > accomplish none of the goals its masters have set out, leaving the
> United
> > States
> > in a position of supporting the Iraqi government despite its failure
> â€" in
> > which
> > case puppet becomes puppeteer â€" or following through on its threat
> and
> > pulling
> > out, blaming the puppet for the mistakes of the puppeteer.  That fig
> leaf
> > will
> > be transparent to all.
> > The ISG's recommendations in several other areas, such as
> improvements to
> > the
> > Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, and the U.S.
> > reconstruction
> > efforts in Iraq, are all, as we say, rearranging the deck chairs on
> the
> > observation deck of the World Trade Center.  Improvements to the
> U.S.
> > budget
> > process, the training of U.S. government personnel and U.S.
> intelligence
> > capabilities will take years to implement, by which time the war will
> be
> > long
> > over.  Like everything else the United States has done in Iraq, will
> be
> > too
> > little, too late.
> >
> > Conclusion
> > It is the unanimous view of the al-Qaeda in Iraq Study Group that,
> because
> > of
> > our tactics and strategy, America has no viable options to stay in
> Iraq.
> > Let us
> > examine five options that President Bush is said to be considering,
> and
> > see
> > why
> > they all fail:
> >
> >
> > â—                      "Go big," or pour in many troops, perhaps
> hundreds
> > of
> > thousands.  But U.S. public opinion strongly opposes this course,
> America
> > does
> > not have these troops in the short run, and by the time they could
> be
> > created
> > the war will be over.
> > â—                      "Go long," or stay in Iraq for many years
> with a
> > small
> > force.  If 140,000 troops cannot win in nearly four years, how can
> far
> > fewer
> > troops win in, say, eight years?   U.S. public opinion would oppose
> this
> > course
> > as sacrificing American troops for nothing.
> > â—                      "Surge," or deploy perhaps 20,000 additional
> troops
> > to
> > Baghdad to stabilize the situation, then withdraw them.  But we
> could
> > simply
> > lay
> > low for awhile in Baghdad and launch attacks elsewhere in Iraq.
> > Alternatively,
> > we could attack the American troops in Baghdad, who would be like
> sitting
> > ducks
> > in a shooting gallery.
> > â—                      "Hunt al-Qaeda," or focus the U.S. military
> effort
> > on
> > attacking our fighters.  But any aggressive U.S. strategy will expose
> more
> > U.S.
> > soldiers to car bombs, house bombs, IEDs, small-arms fire, and
> ambushes.
> > The
> > U.S. public will not stand for these casualties.  In addition, an
> > Americans
> > focus on us will give other insurgent groups a freer hand in their
> > activities.
> > â—                      "Support the Shia," or abandon Sunnis to
> their fate.
> > This
> > will bring on the wrath of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan.  None of
> these
> >
> > nations is at all likely to intervene in Iraq.  In particular, Saudi
> > Arabia's
> > failure to intervene would be a sign of weakness that would further
> > undermine
> > any shred of legitimacy of the House of Saud.
> > With no viable options for staying in Iraq, with the Iraqi
> government
> > collapsing, and with the American public tiring of the daily
> casualties,
> > America
> > will have no choice but to withdraw, leaving Iraq and the region in
> chaos.
> >
> > This will open the way for the next stages of our strategy.  To
> > recapitulate:
> > â—                     We will continue our campaign of chaos.
> > â—                      We will force America to leave Iraq and the
> Middle
> > East in
> > a humiliating defeat.
> > â—                      The American defeat will make any threats of
> U.S.
> > military
> > intervention in the Middle East non-credible for decades to come.
> > â—                      With the American defeat, the so-called
> Iraqi
> > government
> > will fall like a rotten pomegranite, leaving chaos in its wake.
> > â—                      An Iraq in chaos will give us a sanctuary in
> the
> > heart
> > of
> > the Middle East.
> > â—                      From this sanctuary, we will launch attacks
> on Saudi
> >
> > Arabia, Jordan, and others.
> > â—                      The expulsion of the United States from the
> region â€"
> > a
> > fitting coda to the Muslim expulsion from Spain in 1492 â€" will
> leave the
> > corrupt
> > Saudi rulers at the mercy of Iran, whose influence will grow through
> its
> > close
> > links with the Shia in southern Iraq.
> > â—                      Saudi Arabia will be forced to go along with
> Iran's
> > calls
> > for it to drastically reduce its oil exports.
> > â—                      This action, combined with the prospect of
> further
> > chaos
> > in the region, will double or triple the price of oil, forcing the
> West
> > into
> > a
> > depression.
> > â—                      The increase in Iranian oil revenues will
> give Iran
> > still
> > more power to pursue its nuclear ambitions and to secure the support
> of
> > its
> > people.  The scarcity of oil will make China even less willing to go
> > against
> > Iran; the increase of Iranian petrodollars will make Russia even
> less
> > willing to
> > go against Iran.
> > â—                      The weakness of the Saudi government;
> pressure from
> > Iran,
> > Saudi Shiites, Saudi Wahabbis, al-Qaeda, and others; and Saudi
> realization
> > that
> > the United States will not come to its rescue, will force the Saudi
> > monarchy
> > to
> > flee for their lives.
> > â—                      With Arabia no longer Saudi, it will be a
> simple
> > matter to
> > cut back or cut off Arabian oil exports, and incidentally those of
> the
> > small
> > Persian Gulf states, further deepening the West's depression.
> > â—                      An Iranian atomic bomb could lead Egypt to
> develop
> > its
> > own
> > atomic bomb.
> > â—                      With Islam resurgent, it will be only a
> matter of
> > time
> > before an Islamic bomb, whether from Iran, Pakistan, or Egypt, or
> stolen
> > from
> > Russia or bought from a Russian criminal gang, winds up in Tel Aviv,
> > Washington,
> > New York, or London.
> > â—                      Victory will be ours!
> > These steps form a strategy that needs to be implemented in a
> coordinated,
> > sequential fashion, something that we have so far shown ourselves
> well
> > able
> > to
> > do.  Our successes in Iraq have set the stage for broader, and much
> more
> > important, successes in the region and the world.
> > The prospects are dazzling.  There will be many glorious days ahead.
> By
> > continuing to pursue our present way forward, al-Qaeda will emerge
> > stronger
> > and
> > the corrupt infidel governments of the United States and the region
> will
> > be
> > immeasurably weaker.
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > View this message in context:
> > http://www.nabble.com/Iraq-Update-tf4048809.html#a11545715
> > Sent from the Rhodes 22 mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
> >
> > __________________________________________________
> > Use Rhodes22-list at rhodes22.org, Help? www.rhodes22.org/list
> __________________________________________________
> Use Rhodes22-list at rhodes22.org, Help? www.rhodes22.org/list
> __________________________________________________
> Use Rhodes22-list at rhodes22.org, Help? www.rhodes22.org/list


More information about the Rhodes22-list mailing list