[Rhodes22-list] Fwd: Hello from Iraqi Kurdistan! (political)

[Brad Haslett]

Here's some info on the WaPo front page story - still no agenda?


*Monday, September 18, 2006

Imperial Farce* [Ramesh Ponnuru]

(Full disclosure note: Jim O'Beirne is a friend, as is his wife, my
colleague Kate O'Beirne.)


Rajiv Chandrasekaran's
front-pager<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/16/AR2006091600193_pf.html>in
yesterday's
*Washington Post, *about how Jim O'Beirne allegedly hired Bush loyalists
over experts to staff the Iraqi occupation, was a hit piece, pure and
simple: thinly sourced, fantastic in parts, and propagandistic. Note, for
instance, the photo accompanying the story. It shows two "U.S. troops"
relaxing in a swimming pool in the Green Zone, where, according to the
caption, "many Coalition Provisional Authority officials spent their days."
(In the pool?) This has nothing at all to do with Chandrasekaran's
thesis—O'Beirne, even on the reporter's account, was in charge of political
appointees, not the R&R of troops. But the implication is clear: O'Beirne
was sending these political appointees to cushy jobs in Iraq. The article is
excerpted from a book titled *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*.


Chandrasekaran repeats some of the innuendo of earlier iterations of the
Iraq-cronyism charge, notably the claim that "the daughter of a prominent
neoconservative commentator" was "tapped to manage Iraq's $13 billion
budget," even though she had no "background in accounting." That's a double
lie: The woman in question, also a friend of mine, does have a background in
accounting, and she wasn't managing the budget.


To get to the main point of the article: O'Beirne wasn't in charge of
staffing the Coalition Provisional Authority; he didn't have a "staff" of
his own, let alone one that could ask crudely political questions of
applicants; he didn't ask anyone he interviewed about his views on *Roe* v.
*Wade *(a claim that, careful readers will see, Chandrasekaran doesn't quite
tie to O'Beirne); he was eager to find Arabic speakers; and he has never
been deluged with job applicants who opposed the Iraq war and the Bush
administration but wanted to serve in a war zone (surprise, surprise). Much
of the article recapitulates the well-known rivalry between the State
Department and the Pentagon (where O'Beirne works), with some extra
bitterness added by Fred Smith, a CPA official who was forced out. Great
story otherwise!


The bloggers who have decided they believe the *Post*'s account—some of whom
distrust the *Post* in general—don't know a thing about O'Beirne, but are
happy to accept the veracity of an account that gibes so well with all of
their prejudices.

Posted at 11:05
AM<http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MGFlNGY3NDU0ZWI5YTQzMzJiMTEyMzY3MDIyMzZmNWY=>



-------------------------


 September 17, 2006
It's not as easy as it looks to the Washington Post

"Ties to GOP Trumped Know-How Among Staff Sent to Rebuild Iraq," blares the
headline on the front-page of the Washington Post. If true, this would
constitute serious malfeasance by the Bush administration, but the Post's Rajiv
Chandrasekaran<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/16/AR2006091600193.html>doesn't
manage to make the case. He shows that seven senior-level members of
the Coalition Provisional Authority had ties to President Bush, his
administration, or another Republican administrations. But the scant pieces
of information he provides about the seven don't show a lack of "know-how"
(for example, the senior adviser for transportation had been the deputy
secretary of the U.S. Transportation Department; the senior adviser for
higher education had been a college president; the senior adviser for
education had been Bush's education policy adviser). Nor does Chandrasedaran
show that any of these senior advisers performed poorly overall in Iraq.

Instead, he focuses on three other individuals. The first is Jay Hallen, a
24 year-old staffer who was assigned by his boss in Iraq (not the
administration in Washington) to reopen the Baghdad stock market despite a
lack of background in finance. Chandrasedaran does not claim that Hallen had
any meaningful GOP connections -- apparently, he didn't even support the war
in Iraq. So, while one can certainly question giving this assignment to
Hallen, it was not a case of GOP ties trumping know-how. Moreover, in
Chandrasedaran's telling, Hallen's "failing" had nothing to do with lack of
financial expertise. He stands accused, rather, of trying to create a modern
stock market instead of simply reopening the market as it was. In the end,
according to Chandrasedaran, Hallen was outflanked and his vision was not
realized. An interesting story, but no scandal.

Chandrasedaran also finds fault with James Haveman, who was selected to
oversee the rehabilitation of Iraq's health care system. Haveman had been
the director of International Aid, a faith-based relief organization that
provided health care overseas, so he did not lack relevant experience. Nor
does Chandrasedaran show him to be a GOP insider, although he had been a
community health director (additional relevant experience) under a
Republican Governor, John Engler of Michigan. Haveman apparently tried
various market-based strategies to keep costs down, and he sold the
"dysfunctional state owned firm that imported and distributed drugs and
medical supplies" to a private company. His critics say Haveman's approach
proved unsuccessful. But even if that's true, it wouldn't be a case of GOP
ties trumping know-how; it would be a case of a market-based approach not
succeeding. And Chandrasekaran provides little reason to believe that a
different approach would have worked significantly better.

Chandrasedaran's final target is former New York police chief Bernard Kerik.
Chandrasedaran concedes that Kerik was dispatched to Iraq not because of his
GOP ties but because of his "star power." So again, Chandrasedaran's
examples don't support his thesis. Kerik stands accused of the opposite
offense of Haveman -- instead of imposing his theories, Kerik allegedly
ignored the details, courted the media, and left the real work to the State
Department expert in international law enforcement. Chandrasedaran's sources
say that Kerik was "the wrong guy at the wrong time." Kerik says he wasn't
given sufficient funding to hire foreign police advisers or establish
large-scale training programs. Either way, given the presence of Kerik and
the State Department expert, the problem does not appear to have been lack
of policing know-how.

Chandasedaran's piece also suffers from an apparent failure to appreciate
the inherent difficulties of nation-building. These difficulties are not
magically overcome, as Chandasedaran implies, by having international
bureaucrats run the show. Certainly, the U.N.'s performance in delivering
services and keeping the peace in areas less perilous than Iraq is not
without its critics<http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23087,filter.all/pub_detail.asp>.
This is not to deny that some some administrators are better than others,
and that some administrators selected by the Pentagon did not perform well.
But Chandasedaran falls short of demonstrating that the approach our
governement used to select administators for Iraq was fundamentally flawed.
Posted by Paul at 09:02 PM







On 9/18/06, DCLewis1 at aol.com <DCLewis1 at aol.com> wrote:
>
>
> In a message dated 9/18/2006 2:40:16 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
> hparsons at parsonsys.com writes:
>
> Frankly,  I think you're full of shit. You said noting (in the post to
> which
> I  responded) about conscripted Iraqi's or their children. You compared
> our
> actions to the PLC and imagined actions by them.
>
> Your sudden change of  topic to justify your manure does nothing to modify
> my
> original assessment of  you, as a matter of fact, it confirms it.
>
>
> You made no mention of  the Iraq
>
>
>
>
> I assume this is directed at me, and I note that the tone of language is
> inverse to any thought.  Whatever.
>
> If the post frag you're citing is the post I'm think you're citing,
> my  point
> was to consider how you would react in the other persons (and
> Iraqis)  shoes.
> Note, I'm not extending that to Saddam, I'm asking you to think how  the
> average Iraqi,or Iraqi businessman, would feel
> __________________________________________________
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>